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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH

AND SEIZURE

RULE-The United States Supreme Court has
held that evidence seized in reasonable good-faith reliance on a
facially valid search warrant is admissible in the prosecution's
case-in-chief.
-ExCLUSIONARY

United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
In August 1981, the Burbank, California Police Department received a tip from an informant of unproven reliability that two individuals were selling cocaine from their home. The tipster told of
a sale he had witnessed five months earlier.1 The police began an
investigation during which they observed numerous episodes of a
single visitor entering a house, exiting shortly thereafter with a
small bag, and driving away. Further probing revealed the identities of the owners of the particular vehicles; the probation record
of one of the owners showed the name of respondent Alberto
Antonio Leon as that person's employer. Leon was reputedly an
importer of drugs, and had been arrested on drug charges in 1980.2
Based on observations of various transactions at three residences,
as well as activities of the two persons originally implicated by the
tip,3 the Burbank police applied to state superior court for a search
4
warrant.
The superior court issued a warrant, listing for seizure various
items related to alleged drug-trafficking activities, and authorizing
the search of the three residences and the cars of Leon and three
other respondents. The ensuing searches uncovered large quantities of drugs in the homes of all the respondents and in the cars of
two. A grand jury empaneled in the District Court for the Central
District of California indicted all four respondents on charges of
conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.'
The respondents filed motions in district court to suppress the
1. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3409-10 (1984).
2. Id. at 3410. Other information on Leon included a second-hand report that Leon
stored large quantities of methaqualone in his home in Glendale, California. Id.
3. Id. The two individuals named by the informant were Armando Sanchez and Patsy.
Stewart. Police observed the two take separate flights to Miami and return together to Los
Angeles, where a search of their luggage revealed a small amount of marijuana. Id.
4. Id. An affidavit prepared by Cyril Rombach, "an experienced and well-trained narcotics officer," supported the application. Id.
5. Id.
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evidence found in the searches. After an evidentiary hearing, the
court granted the motion in part, noting that not all of the respondents had standing to challenge all the searches.' The court found
the affidavit used to support the warrant application insufficient to
allow a determination of probable cause. The court admitted that
the submitting officer had acted in good faith, but refused to entertain the government's suggestion that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not apply to7 evidence seized in good-faith
reliance on a facially valid warrant.
On appeal by the government, a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.' The court of appeals decision centered on the informant's
lack of reliability." The Supreme Court granted the government's
petition for certiorari.10
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, concluding that
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule permits, in the prosecution's case-in-chief, the use of evidence seized in reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant. Writing for the majority,
6. Id. at 3410-11 n.1. Respondent Leon moved to suppress the evidence found on his
person and in his home; respondents Stewart and Sanchez moved to suppress evidence
found at their residence and at an unoccupied condominium. Stewart moved to exclude
statements made during the search of her home in her motion, and Sanchez wanted to exclude statements made shortly after that. Respondent Ricardo Del Castillo moved to bar all
evidence from all the searches, and all four objected to the use of evidence found in their
cars. Id. at 3410 n.1.
7. Id. at 3411. The District Court considered the information in the affidavit to be
stale. Id. at 3411 n.2. The District Court's decision is unreported.
8. 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983).
9. 104 S. Ct. at 3411. The Court of Appeals relied on the two-element test for probable
cause determinations provided in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Supreme Court
there held that information presented to a magistrate must provide a substantial underlying
basis for the informant's knowledge of the criminal activity of which he informs the police,
and the informant's reliability must be sufficiently confirmed. 378 U.S. at 114. The Court
reaffirmed this approach in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), where it reversed
a racketeering conviction because the warrant for the search failed the Aguilar test, even
though the search revealed damning evidence. The failure had not been cured by independent subsequent police investigation. 393 U.S. at 417.
In the present case, the Ninth Circuit considered the informant's information fatally stale,
in that it failed to establish the tipster's knowledge of current criminal activity. The affidavit also failed to show facts demonstrating the informant's reliability. The court of appeals
reasoned that the affidavit was therefore insufficient, and evidence seized under a warrant
procured by use of the affidavit was seized without probable cause, and properly suppressed.
104 S. Ct. at 3411.
10. 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983). In its petition, the government refused to discuss the question of probable cause based on these facts, choosing instead to explore the question of
whether the Supreme Court should promulgate an exception to the exclusionary rule allowing use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence seized in reasonable good-faith reliance on a warrant ultimately found to be without probable cause. 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
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Justice White1" quickly dismissed any notion that the fourth
amendment necessarily implies an exclusionary rule, or that the
rule grows out of a union of fourth and fifth amendment guarantees.1 2 Turning to the question of the propriety of the rule's use in
this case, Justice White asserted that generally, application of the
rule adversely affects the smooth and effective operation of the
criminal justice system. He concluded, therefore, that use of the
exclusionary sanction must be restricted to those instances in
which its objectives will be best served.
The majority opinion characterized the rule's major objective as
general deterrence of official conduct in contravention of fourth
amendment guarantees.1 3 Justice White maintained that the propriety of exclusion in a particular case is a separate issue from
whether fourth amendment rights were violated, and that only the
former issue was before the Court. Justice White chose to resolve
the question by balancing the costs against the benefits of excluding highly probative evidence from the prosecution's case-inchief.14" The Court admitted that application of the rule is still unquestionably appropriate in response to a flagrant and purposeful
violation of the fourth amendment,1 5 but asserted that the costbenefit analysis leaned unduly toward the cost side when the
courts imposed the exclusionary sanction on good-faith mistakes
by officers. A short modern history of the rule followed, in which
Justice White demonstrated that the rule has been modified so extensively that it is not applied in many situations."
11. Id. Justice White began by noting that although it was within the Court's power to
address the probable cause question under the recent decision in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983), that issue had not been briefed or argued; the Court declined to address the
issue. 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
12. Id. Justice White stated that the fourth amendment violation is the illegal search
and seizure of evidence, not its use at trial. Id.
13. Id. Justice White borrowed the ideas of most effective use of the rule and its general deterrent nature from United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra,the
Court held that a witness may not refuse to answer grand jury questions on the ground that
they are based on illegally procured evidence. 414 U.S. at 342.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 3412-13. In a footnote, the Court provided statistics which show that
between 2.8% and 7.1% of persons arrested on felony drug charges are not prosecuted or
convicted because of exclusion of evidence. Id. at 3413 n.6. These figures are especially disturbing, the Court said, when the law enforcement officers who committed the errors resulting in a suspect's release have acted in good-faith reliance on a facially valid search warrant.
Id. at 3413.
15. Id. at 3413-14. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks,the Court
held that the fourth amendment requires an evidentiary hearing into the truth of facts
stated in the affidavit if the defendant makes a proper challenge. Id. at 155.
16. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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The Court stated a preference for searches conducted pursuant
to warrants, because the issuing magistrate is not closely involved
with the case and is therefore in a better position to decide on the
existence of probable cause than the law enforcement officer, who
may be preoccupied with the logistics of apprehending a suspected
criminal. Justice White noted that because reasonable minds may
differ as to an affidavit's sufficiency in setting forth probable cause,
reviewing courts should defer as much as possible to the magistrate's determination. He added, however, that this deference is
not unlimited.1 7 Justice White asserted that throughout the rule's
history, the Court has developed a solid rationale for exclusion
only in cases of deliberate fourth amendment violations. He
pointed out that in cases of questionable magistrate neutrality or
meager information in the affidavit, the Court has excluded evidence without considering whether exclusion will serve fourth
amendment interests."8 In any event, the Court concluded, the exclusionary rule is too harsh a sanction to apply in these latter types
of cases.
In the Court's view, the appropriate application of the exclusionary rule is to law enforcement officers, because it is only on these
individuals and their departments that the rule can have any deterrent effect. Justice White added that the rule will not deter objectively reasonable police activity, and should not be applied in
such situations. The Court reasoned that where an officer reasonably believes he was acting correctly, exclusion will not deter future
misconduct, because the officer will not know what he did wrong,
and will be unable to avoid errors in the future.' 9 If an officer acts
17. 104 S. Ct. at 3417. Justice White listed examples of various possible fourth amendment situations and outlined a reviewing court's proper role in each. Where appropriate, a
court should investigate any knowing or reckless falsity contained in the affidavit. See, e.g.,
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). A court should also make sure that the magistrate
performed his function in the required "neutral and detached" manner; "rubber-stamping"
will not be tolerated. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). Reviewing
courts should guard against the granting of warrants based on insufficient information. See,
e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Courts must also use Gates to assure that the
warrant was not granted after improper analysis of that case's "totality of the circumstances" standard. 104 S. Ct. at 3417-18.
18. 104 S. Ct. at 3418. The Court saw no basis for the idea that exclusion in case of
non-deliberate violation will deter magistrates from making shoddy probable cause determinations, because the exclusionary rule is a "systemic" rather than specific deterrent. Magistrates are simply not close enough to the law enforcement process to feel the effects of a
particular exclusion. Id.
19. Id. at 3419. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). The Peltier Court
held that the rule of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), proscribing
warrantless Border Patrol searches too far from the border, did not operate retroactively to
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in reasonable good-faith reliance on a facially valid warrant, Justice White maintained, there is no official misconduct to deter.2 0
Because the cost of excluding evidence (release of a guilty criminal) far outweighs the benefit (possible deterrence of fourth
amendment violations), the exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy in such cases.2 1
According to Justice White, application of the principles set
forth by the majority to the case at bar required reversal of the
Ninth Circuit. The warrant involved was facially valid, and the arresting officer had acted in reasonable good-faith reliance.22
Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion2 3 in which
he said that the Court had made the proper decision as to whether
the exclusionary rule should be modified. He stated, however, that
the decision was necessarily provisional because it was based on
various empirical judgments. Such judgments may change, he
warned, as their significance in the real world of criminal law enforcement and litigation is tested. If it is later found that the new
rule does not work well outside the realm of judicial thought, the
Court will have to reconsider its position. This, Justice Blackmun
maintained, was consistent with the history of the rule, which
changes as understanding of the rule's effects deepens.
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall. 4 Justice
Brennan disagreed with the majority's cost-benefit approach to the
exclude evidence from a similar search performed before the date of the Almeida-Sanchez
decision.
In a footnote, the Court was careful to point out that an officer's reliance on a warrant
must be objectively reasonable before a good-faith exception may apply. 104 S. Ct. at 3420
n.20.
20. Id. at 3420. According to the Court, an officer who has been handed a facially valid
warrant cannot be expected to point out possible magisterial errors. "Penalizing the officer
for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations." Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 3421. The Court described situations in which the new good-faith rule will
not apply. Substantial and deliberate violations and episodes of questionable magistrate
neutrality headed the list. Also, a good-faith exception could not apply to a facially invalid
warrant, for example, one that failed to list in detail the items to be seized. Id. at 3421-22.
Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
22. 104 S. Ct. at 3423. Before concluding, the Court noted that it had left unchanged
the current probable cause standards, as well as the other prerequisites of a valid warrant. A
court confronted with the problem in the future may decide the good-faithissue before or
after the question of fourth amendment violation depending on the magnitude of the problem. The Court was not persuaded that the good-faith exception will discourage defendants
from raising suppression questions, thereby "freezing" fourth amendment law in its current
state. 104 S. Ct. at 3422-23.
23. Id. at 3423-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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problem, claiming that it ignored the fundamental question of
whether the framers of the Constitution intended to limit the
power of the criminal justice system in order to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding citizens. Justice Brennan maintained
that this was the framers' intent, and that it was the Court's constitutionally mandated task to carry out that intent in the admin25
istration of criminal justice.
Justice Brennan saw no difference between an improper admission at trial of illegally seized evidence and its illegal seizure; both
are components of a violation of fourth amendment guarantees. In
his view, the Court relied too heavily on the exclusionary rule's deterrent function and ignored its proper use as a device to prevent
the courts from "completing" a violation of a defendant's fourth
amendment rights by admitting unlawfully procured evidence.
While admitting that exclusion is not expressly mandated by the
Constitution, Justice Brennan hastened to add that some of the
most important Constitutional commands are implied by that document's broad language.2
The dissent proceeded to examine Weeks v. United States, 7 the
case which created the modern exclusionary rule, and which Justice Brennan believed set forth the proper philosophy of the rule's
application. Weeks stands for the proposition that illegally seized
evidence may not be used at any time; Justice Brennan insisted
that without this remedy, the fourth amendment was meaningless.
The only way to make the respondents in the present case whole
for the invasion of their privacy in violation of fourth amendment
rights, Justice Brennan maintained, would be to exclude the fruits
of such violations from use in the prosecution of this case.28
25. Id. at 3431. Justice Brennan supported his position with a quotation from James
Madison's address to Congress, in which Madison characterized the protections provided by
the fourth (and other) amendments as "an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption
of power in the Legislative or Executive." Id. at 3431 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439
(1789)).
26. Id. at 3432. Justice Brennan viewed the fourth amendment as a limit on the power
of the entire government; the judiciary is limited as much as the law enforcement community. Id.
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks involved a prosecution for sending illegal lottery tickets through the mails. The police seized evidence from the defendant's house in violation of
the fourth amendment; the trial court later denied defendant's petition for return of the
pertinent evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new
trial. Id. at 399.
28. 104 S. Ct. at 3438 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan saw the costs derided
by the majority as the price paid for freedom from unreasonable searches. Id. at 3436. A
cost-benefit analysis of the problem appeared misleading to Justice Brennan, who felt that
personal freedoms are too important to depend solely on empirical data for support. Id. at
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Justice Brennan went on to predict that the Court's decision
would remove a law enforcement officer's (or institution's) incentive to carefully comply with the fourth amendment and probable
cause requirements, because a slightly deficient warrant may still
bring useful evidence if the executing officer relied on it in reasonable good faith.2 9
Justice Brennan concluded by warning that combative attitudes
toward growing crime can make abandonment of fourth amendment rights seem like a ready solution, but that in reality such a
course is a mistake. Once such rights are sacrificed, he said, they
are difficult to recover.30
Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent,-" recognizing first that
the Court had admitted that a fourth amendment violation had
occurred in Leon, but had refused to exclude evidence found in the
violating search because that search was reasonable. According to
Justice Stevens, the paradox that developed is that a search may
be deemed reasonable and unreasonable at the same time. Constitutionally, he said, these facts cannot exist together.2
Justice Stevens chastised the Court for failing to remand the
case for consideration in light of Illinois v. Gates33 to settle the
issue of probable cause. In his view, the standards announced so
recently in Gates would handily dispose of the case at bar. In addition, Justice Stevens stated, such a course would be more consistent With the Court's practice of following settled procedures in the
interest of dispensing justice as fairly as possible.
Until this point, Justice Stevens continued, mere reliance on a
warrant was not presumptively reasonable; the framers would have
summarily dismissed any such notion. The function of warrant review is not only to investigate police misconduct, but magistrate
3437-38. Additionally, the amount of prosecutions actually abandoned because of suppression is, according to Justice Brennan, quite low. Id. at 3441.
29. Id. at 3444. Justice Brennan added that magistrates will begin to believe their'
warrants are effectively shielded from review, and that the level of "care and attention devoted to such an inconsequential chore will dwindle." Id.
Justice Brennan also wondered why the Court's decision was necessary in light of the
previous term's decision in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), which made probable
cause standards as flexible as they can safely become. Justice Brennan noted the possibility
of finding a warrant deficient under Gates while still finding the officer's conduct reasonable
under a good-faith exception. 104 S. Ct. at 3445. Justice Stevens examines this problem in
detail in his dissent, 104 S. Ct. at 3446. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
30. 104 S. Ct. at 3446.
31. Id. at 3446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 3450.
33. Id. at 3447. See supra notes 11, 17, and 29 and accompanying text.
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error as well. Justice Stevens contended that a finding of either
defect should result in exclusion of evidence."'
Justice Stevens maintained that the exclusionary rule's main
function is prevention of fourth amendment transgressions. He
said that the Court's decision jeopardizes that function by allowing
law enforcement officers to submit "borderline" applications for
warrants without seeking additional evidence tending to show
probable cause. The majority's "double standard of reasonableness" 35 will, in Justice Stevens prediction, sap the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule of its supporting strength. Courts
will actually motivate constitutional violations by allowing unlawfully seized evidence to find its way into the prosecution's case-inchief.
Justice Stevens asserted that the Constitution requires a stricter
standard of protection for individual liberties, and that the loss of
evidence tending to prove certain guilt in some cases is the justifiable cost of such protection. Our personal freedoms, said Justice
Stevens, require that the Bill of Rights, which is indeed a bundle
of rights, have corresponding remedies. The exclusionary rule is, in
Justice Stevens' view, the proper remedy for violations of the
fourth amendment.3
The genesis of the modern exclusionary rule was Weeks v.
United States,7 in which the government used evidence seized in
a warrantless search to convict the petitioner of selling illegal lottery tickets through the mails. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if the guarantees of the fourth amendment were to have
any meaning, police and courts had to be restrained from using
evidence taken in violation of those protections. The use of such
evidence, the Court maintained, would
render violations of the
38
fourth amendment without remedy.
The scope of the rule expanded and contracted as its use became
an element of federal criminal procedure. In Silverthorne Lumber
34. Id. at 3452. Justice Stevens believed that the framers were as much concerned
with "the unreasonable issuance of warrants" as with the improper execution of searches.
Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 3455.
36. Id. at 3456.
37. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See supra note 27.
38. Id. at 391-93. Justice Day, writing for a unanimous Court, admonished, "[tihe tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions by means
of unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights." Id. at 392.
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Co. v. United States,39 the Court considered whether the exclusionary rule should apply to a corporate defendant, who had been
ajudged in contempt for refusing to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum. The government based its subpoena on evidence unlawfully
seized by federal officers. In concluding that the evidence should
have been excluded from any _proceedings, Justice Holmes noted
that the seizure of the information without a warrant was a willful
and substantial fourth amendment violation under the Weeks rationale, and that the government could not be allowed to profit
from its own wrong by using illegally seized evidence to obtain a
subpoena.40
The Court's opinion in Olmstead v. United States4 1 made clear
that the rule would not be applied to every situation in which the
defendant felt that his rights had been invaded. In Olmstead, evidence gathered with telephone taps had helped convict the petitioners of conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act. There was no
invasion of the petitioners' houses or private places; the government recorded conversations in the basement of an office building.
The Court affirmed the convictions. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Taft maintained that because there was no physical trespass on the petitioners' property, there was no fourth amendment
violation. The principle of liberal construction of the fourth
amendment did not, in the Court's view, justify the extension of
of "persons,
the amendment (and its sanction) beyond the scope
42
houses, papers and effects" as provided in the text.
Dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule first became significant
when the question of its application to state criminal proceedings
arose. In 1949, the Court decided Wolf v. Colorado,3 in which it
held that state courts were not bound to exclude evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment. In Wolf, the authorities took
patient records from a physician's office without a warrant; the
physician was subsequently convicted of conspiracy to commit
abortion. The Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, af-39. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
40. Id. at 392.
41. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
42. Id. at 466. Justice Holmes dissented. He saw the fourth amendment as putting the
nation to a choice between ease of prosecution of criminals and less intrusive government;
Holmes favored the latter. He also mentioned that if his choice were followed, "no distinctions can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge,"
277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting), an idea which Justice Brennan pursues in his dissent in Leon. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
43. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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firmed the conviction, holding that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment did not require states to adhere to the specific restrictions of the first eight amendments in criminal cases.
Justice Frankfurter maintained that the fourth amendment guarantees privacy rights to all citizens; enforcement, however, may be
accomplished in a variety of ways. 4
The Wolf rationale once again found favor with the Court in Irvine v. California," in which a police officer recruited a locksmith
to make a key to petitioner's home, where the officer planted recording devices. The trial court convicted the petitioner on gambling charges with evidence from the recordings. The Court affirmed, pointing out that the fourteenth amendment does not
require exclusion of evidence in state proceedings, and that the
states must be given the chance to choose their own remedies."
The first significant step toward federally mandated application
of the exclusionary rule in the states occurred in Elkins v. United
States,4 7 where the Court reversed federal convictions for communications law violations procured with evidence that had originally
been unlawfully seized by state officers. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that evidence illegally seized by state authorities could not be used in a federal prosecution. The Court thus
rejected the so-called "silver platter" doctrine,'48 which had permit44. 338 U.S. at 28. Justice Frankfurter presented data showing rejection of the Weeks
doctrine by a substantial majority of the states. The data even included information on
British Commonwealth courts throughout the world. Id. at 29-30. Justice Frankfurter
pointed out that the states that had rejected the exclusionary rule had other methods to
protect privacy rights, including causes of action for damages and statutory actions for maliciously procuring a search warrant. Id. at 30 n.1.
45. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
46. Id. at 134. Justice Jackson said for the majority that "[t]o upset state convictions
• . . before the states have had adequate opportunity to adopt or'reject the rule would be an
unwarranted use of federal power." Id.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion in Wolf, dissented in Irvine. 347 U.S.
at 142 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He considered the blatant invasion of the petitioner's
home in Irvine so outrageous that it offended canons of due process in the same manner as
police conduct did in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which officers had a suspect's stomach pumped in an effort to retrieve swallowed contraband. Such heinous conduct, said Justice Frankfurter, was violative of principles of due process, while the warrantless seizure of files in Wolf did not cross that line. 347 U.S. at 144-45.
47. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
48. Id. at 223. The Court borrowed the phrase "silver-platter" from Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), a case decided the same day as Wolf. "The crux of [the] doctrine
is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a
federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." Id. at 78-79. The Elkins Court saw no difference between the two
methods of obtaining evidence for purposes of fourth amendment analysis; seizure by state
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ted federal prosecutors to use evidence illegally seized by state officers, even though the federal authorities could not have used the
evidence if they had taken it in the same manner.
Elkins foreshadowed the Court's decision one year later in Mapp
v. Ohio."" Mapp appealed her state pornography conviction, which
resulted from the forcible, warrantless entry of her home on a
vague suspicion of her relationship to a bombing incident. The
search revealed pornographic materials. The Court reversed, expressly overruling Wolf insofar as that case held illegally seized evidence admissible in state courts. The majority, through Justice
Clark, reiterated the values set forth in Weeks, and declared that
that case mandated enforcement of the fourth amendment by exclusion of illegally seized evidence in state courts.5 0 Such a rule was
necessary, in the Court's view, to assure uniformity of practice between state and federal courts."'
Mapp continues as the general standard for the treatment of illegally seized evidence in state courts. The exclusionary rule also
still applies in federal courts, with various exceptions. These exceptions arose mainly from increasing dissatisfaction with the rule
that began to surface in the early years of the Burger Court.52 Suspicions about the rule's real value as a deterrent of fourth amendment violations encouraged judicial limitation of any possible ex5 3 the
pansion of the rule's scope. In United States v. Calandra,
Court held that a witness may not refuse to answer grand jury
questions on the ground that those questions arose from unlawfully obtained evidence. Justice Powell reasoned for the Court that
exclusion from grand jury proceedings would do nothing to further
the deterrent aims of the rule, and would only hinder the administration of criminal justice."4
officers cannot be used as a "shield" for federal prosecutors. 364 U.S. at 215.
49. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
50. Id. at 654-55. According to the Court, the balance of states opposed to Weeks had
changed from the days of Wolf, when Justice Frankfurter insisted that state support for the
exclusionary rule was slight. Id. at 651. See supra note 39. Also, the other remedies designed
to protect privacy rights had not been successful. 367 U.S. at 651-53.
51. Id. at 657.
52. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), Chief Justice Burger expressed his discomfort with the exclusionary sanction in the form of a grudging admission of its necessity: "Although I would hesitate to
abandon [the rule] until some meaningful substitute is developed, the history of the suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective
in accomplishing its stated objective." Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 351. Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 355, follows the basic philosophy of his
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Stone v. Powel1" concerned the admissibility of illegally procured evidence in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The Court,
again through Justice Powell, held that a prisoner who has had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claims
will not be heard to raise such issues in a federal habeas corpus
suit. Calandra supported the Court's belief that exclusion in such
a case would not significantly deter fourth amendment violations;
Justice Powell added that the costs of releasing
a convicted mur56
derer did not justify the benefits of exclusion.
The Court steadily narrowed the scope of the rule throughout
the late Seventies. The state convicted the petitioners in Rakas v.
Illinois5 of armed robbery after police found a rifle under the seat
of a car in which the petitioners were passengers. The Court allowed the convictions to stand, stating that it was settled law that
fourth amendment rights could not be asserted vicariously. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion said that because the petitioners had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of another person's automobile, they had no standing to object to an illegal search of the
vehicle5 8
dissent in Leon. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. He also cited 18 U.S.C. §
2515 (1968), which prohibits admission of illegal wiretap evidence into grand jury proceedings, to support his position that all illegally seized evidence should be so excluded. 414 U.S.
at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
56. Id. at 486-87. Justice White, who wrote for the majority in Leon, dissented in
Stone. Id. at 536. His opinion shows the roots of Leon:
The rule has been much criticized and suggestions have been made that it should
be wholly abolished, but I would overrule neither Weeks v. United States nor Mapp
v. Ohio. I am nevertheless of the view that the rule should be substantially modified
so as to prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence at
issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. These are
recurring situations; and recurringly evidence is excluded without any realistic expectation that its exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the purposes of the rule,
even though the trial will be seriously affected or the indictment dismissed.
Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). The major portion of the dissent concerned the proposed
good-faith exception, although Justice White voted to affirm the habeas corpus release of
the respondents.
On the same day, the Court decided United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), in which
Justice Blackmun used the "incremental deterrence" rationale of Calandra and Stone to
hold that illegally seized evidence excluded from a state criminal proceeding need not be
kept out of a civil suit by or against the United States. Id. at 448.
57. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
58. Id. at 148. See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Justice White
dissented once again in Rakas, joined this time by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and
Justice Stevens, the three Leon dissenters. 439 U.S. at 156. Justice White did not mention a
good-faith exception, but believed rather that a car is no different than a house for fourth
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The Court held in Michigan v. DeFillippo59 that where an arrest
and search incident to it were made pursuant to a substantive
criminal statute which was later declared unconstitutional, evidence found in that search will not be suppressed. The challenged
statute was indeed subsequently found unconstitutional, but the
Court maintained that exclusion could deter no official misconduct
if the officer acted in reliance on a statute that was valid when the
arrest and search were performed. 0
The Court has recently created exceptions which allow illegally
obtained evidence to be presented indirectly, in parts of the case
that do not constitute the prosecution's case-in-chief. In United
States v. Havens, 1 for example, the Court held it permissible for
the government to impeach a defendant's credibility in cross-examination with evidence otherwise barred from the case-in-chief.
The Court saw no constitutional problem in the use of suppressed
evidence for impeachment purposes, and valued the effective operation of cross examination which was ensured by admitting such
evidence. Also, the majority viewed as slight the probability of deterrence of official misconduct by exclusion at the cross-examination stage.63
The Court's decision in Leon has engendered much concern over
the possible impact its future application could have on fourth
amendment rights." Justice Brennan addressed these concerns at
length in his dissent.6 Just as important, however, are issues of
judicial prudence raised by creating a major exception to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule only pne term after expanding
probable cause standards to their broadest point in years, as the
Court did recently in Illinois v. Gates6 5 The problem presented in
amendment purposes; this was precisely the sort of violation to which the exclusionary sanction should apply. Id. at 168 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also noted that the Court
had previously heard the merits of an automobile search objection in Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970), in which the petitioner was not the owner of the car.
59. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
60. Id. at 39-40.
61. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
62. Id. at 627-28. The respondent in Havens denied on the stand that he had anything
to do with sewing false pockets into a T-shirt to serve as a hiding place for drugs, and that
he had a T-shirt with pieces missing in his luggage. The government then introduced the
suppressed T-shirt to impeach respondent's credibility. The Supreme Court overturned the
Fifth Circuit's reversal of the conviction.
63. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HAjtv. L. REV. 87 (1984). This article
notes with concern that the good-faith exception may be extended to warrantless searches.
Id. at 115-18.
64. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
65. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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Leon could have been solved by the application of the Gates standards; such an approach would have maintained the integrity of
that decision, while leaving the modification of the exclusionary
rule for a more appropriate opportunity.
Illinois v. Gates significantly revised the standards magistrates
may use in determining whether an application presents sufficient
evidence or probable cause to allow the issuance of a search warrant. Whereas before a magistrate was required to consider an informant's credibility and the veracity of his tip,"6 now an assessment must be made of the probable cause situation in light of the
totality of surrounding circumstances. 7 Such principles could easily have been applied in Leon. The Court reasonably could have
found upon examination of the warrant proceedings below that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, the California magistrate had a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause. 8 The
Supreme Court thus could have reversed on much less controversial grounds. Instead, the Court chose to address the propriety of a
modification, and ruled in favor of such a change. 9 Without commenting on the merits of the modification itself, it is possible to
66. This two-part analysis came from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), in which
the Court held that an application for a warrant must sufficiently demonstrate an informant's reliability ("credibility" element) and his knowledge of the criminal activity about
which he informs ("veracity" element). See supra note 9.
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2328. The respondents in Gates successfully moved to suppress 350
pounds of marijuana found in the trunk of their car, on the ground that the search warrant
lacked probable cause. The information used to apply for the warrant consisted of an anonymous letter (the "tip") and an 'affidavit supporting the occurrence of facts that happened
as predicted in the letter. Based on Aguilar and Spinelli, the Illinois state courts held that
there was no probable cause, because the application failed to prove the informant's credibility, and the defects in the application had not been cured by subsequent police investigation. 103 S. Ct. at 2325-27.
Reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Aguilar/Spinelli
tests were too rigid. The better approach was to allow the magistrate to consider all the
relevant circumstances before coming to a conclusion on probable cause. Veracity and credibility were, in the Court's view, two of many elements of this "totality of circumstances."
103 S. Ct. at 2328. Justice Rehnquist noted that "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning
on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id.
68. Important factors in the decision would likely have included the fact that the tip
was five months old when received. Balanced against this consideration would be the activities the police observed in August 1981: the "small bag" transactions, the mysterious plane
flights between Miami and Los Angeles taken by respondents Stewart and Sanchez, see
supra note 3, and Leon's relationship to respondent Del Castillo, including the use of Leon's
residence in the alleged conspiracy, see supra note 2.
69. The Court requested briefs on the modification question from counsel in Gates,
but refused to address the issue in its opinion because it had not been raised in the Illinois
courts. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2320-25 (1983).
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take issue with the timing of the new rule in relation to Gates, a
case one term old that would have adequately governed the situation presented. At the least, such a course of action conflicts with
the Court's reputation for judicial prudence and undermines the
integrity of the earlier decision.
The Leon decision does not lack cited precedent, but it was not
adequately foreshadowed by decisions immediately preceding it.
Previous exceptions to the rule have been heralded by decisions
one or two terms earlier that laid the foundation for change.
Rarely has the Court created a modification while the logic of a
relevant recent case was still fresh. In Alderman v. United
States," the Court, through Justice White, rejected the contention
that what is inadmissible against one conspirator should be excluded as to all co-conspirators. The Court's rationale was that vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights is inappropriate.
This fit squarely within the reasoning offered in a case from the
previous term, Simmons v. United States," where the Court held
that a defendant's testimony as to his guilt at a suppression hearing will be admitted at trial unless he objects. No one else may
successfully object to such admission; that would constitute vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights.
Calandra72 also drew support from previous decisions. In
Branzburg v. Hayes, 5 the Court decided that a reporter could not
70. 394 U.S. 169 (1969). The petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 875(c) (1964). While certiorari was pending, it was discovered that evidence had been obtained by illegal electronic
surveillance. The Court held that only the person whose fourth amendment rights were violated may properly move to suppress. 394 U.S. at 171.
71. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Petitioners allegedly robbed a federally insured savings
&
loan. At a hearing on one of the petitioner's motions to suppress certain suitcases offered by
the government, the petitioner testified that he owned items found in one of the suitcases.
The petitioner objected to the admission of such testimony at trial on the issue of guilt,
because it was given in satisfaction of a standing requirement; namely, that one who moves
to suppress evidence have a possessory interest in it. Id. at 389-90.
The Alderman Court cited Simmons to support the proposition that only a "victim" of an
illegal search may assert related fourth amendment rights. 394 U.S. at 173-74.
72. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See supra notes 13, 48 and accompanying text.
73. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Branzburg, employing at one point a balancing approach similar to the one used in Leon. Deciding that the
first amendment affords a reporter no unqualified privilege to withhold evidence, the Court
said that
[wie perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential,
but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that
reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course
of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.

1210

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1195

refuse on the basis of the first amendment to answer questions of a
grand jury as to the identity of drug dealers about whom he had
written an article. The first amendment, the Court held, was not
designed to protect agreements to conceal the identity of alleged
criminals. In United States v. Dionisio,7 4 the Court held that the
government need not show the reasonableness of a subpoena for
voice prints under the fourth amendment, because a subpoena did
not amount to a seizure as that term is used in the fourth amendment. The grand jury exception announced in Calandrawas therefore not dropped into a pool of conflicting decisions. A recent tradition of non-exclusion in grand jury and subpoena cases had
already begun.
In one circuit where a good-faith exception has met with some
success, the creation of the rule followed other decisions in that
direction, and did not conflict iith other relevant decisions. In
United States v. Williams 75 the defendant-appellee prevailed on a
motion to suppress evidence related to her indictment for possession with intent to distribute heroin. The Fiftli Circuit initially affirmed the exclusion, but reversed after a rehearing en banc,
adopting an exception remarkably similar to the one developed in
Leon. The year before, in United States v. Wolffs, 76 the Fifth Cir408 U.S. at 690-91.
Justice Powell used Branzburg as a major pillar of support for his opinion in Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 343-46 (1974), reasoning that the importance of the grand jury's function (a
notion set forth in Branzburg)justified an exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule in grand jury situations. 414 U.S. at 347-52. See also supra note 13.
74. 410 U.S. 1 (1973). Justice Stewart, writing for the Dionisio majority, distinguished
between a subpoena of voice prints or handwriting samples for identification purposes, and
an actual search involving a substantial invasion of privacy. In the former case, he said, no
fourth amendment interests attach, because voice and handwriting are always available for
the public to hear or see. Id. at 13-15. Dionisio's importance for the Calandra decision involved the Court's emerging preference for smooth operation of the grand jury. Calandra,
414 U.S. at 350.
75. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). In Williams, a Drug Enforcement Administration
officer arrested the defendant at the airport for violation of a court-imposed travel restriction while her appeal from denial of a suppression motion relating to another offense was
pending. The officer obtained a warrant to search the defendant's luggage; the warrant was
later found to be without probable cause. Id. at 833-35.
76. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979). Wolffs involved various transactions in marijuana between a soldier in the Army and the civilian defendant. The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction on entrapment grounds, 594 F.2d at 79, but decided that the defendant's suppression motion was properly denied. The defendant's motion rested on alleged violations by
law enforcement officers of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976), which provides that instrumentalities of the military shall not be used to execute the laws of the
United States. The court reasoned that because this violation was an isolated occurrence,
exclusion was unnecessary. 594 F.2d at 85. Williams cites Wolffs to support the proposition
that exclusion is pointless in cases of good-faith mistake. 622 F.2d at 845-46.
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cuit refused to exclude illegally obtained evidence, because the
seizure was performed in an isolated instance of good-faith
mistake.
The propriety of the Leon decision seems even more questionable considering the Court's reverential discussion of judicial discretion in Gates.77 The Court refused to address the modification
question in Gates because it had not been raised in the Illinois
state courts. The Court declined to hear the issue on these grounds
even though it had requested briefs on this question.78 So deciding,
the Court proceeded to resolve Gates on a probable cause basis.
The same canons of judicial prudence, for which the Court displayed respect in Gates,79 would seem to indicate that once a case
controlling the issue had been handed down, that decision should
control Leon-type cases until the controlling case becomes unworkable, or the time otherwise becomes ripe for a change. A modification is as improper when recently settled grounds for decision exist
as when the question did not arise below.
It remains to be seen whether a rule that is a hybrid of Gates
and Leon will make significant incursions into the fourth amendment rights all Americans enjoy. In a more general sense, though,
the possibility that a court of last resort may, in rapid succession,
make laws that do not work well together merits some concern.
Adam R. Barr

77. The Court spent the first portion of the Gates opinion discussing reasons why it
should not decide the modification question. Justice Rehnquist was first concerned that the
question might not fit properly within the Court's certiorari jurisdiction as provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3): 103 S. Ct. at 2321. He also noted that a question not raised below is
unlikely to be adequately prepared for review; this is the "not pressed or passed upon below" doctrine. Id. at 2322. See also infra note 74.
78. See supra note 64.
79. The Court said in Gates, "[wihere difficult issues of great public importance are
involved, there are strong reasons to adhere to the customary limits on our discretion. By
doing so, we 'promote respect. . for the Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of
[our] decisions.' Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. at 677, 81 S. Ct. at 1703, (Harlan, J., dissenting)." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983).

